Still no verdict from jury in Nunavut police homicide trial
Eleven-person jury must choose between manslaughter or first-degree murder

As of 10 p.m. March 8, an 11-person jury sitting in Iqaluit was still deliberating the question of whether Pingoatuk Kolola is guilty of first degree murder or manslaughter. (SKETCH BY ERIN BOAKE)
The fate of a Nunavut man on trial for the killing of RCMP Const. Douglas Scott in November of 2007 in Kimmirut rests on one issue: intent.
As of 6:30 p.m. March 10, an 11-person jury sitting in Iqaluit had yet to reach a verdict. The jury has been been deliberating since mid-afternoon March 8 to decide between first-degree murder or manslaughter. The jury has already reviewed certain trial transcripts from witnesses that they requested from Justice Robert Kilpatrick.
“In Canada, any blameworthy death that is not murder is called manslaughter,” Kilpatrick said in his instructions to the jury March 8.
Kilpatrick explained the legal definition of the word “intent,” which has become the crux of the issue that Crown and defence lawyers have left in the hands of the jury.
Kilpatrick said if Kolola fired on Scott with intent the to kill or hurt him, then he’s guilty of murder.
Kilpatrick said if Kolola fired on Scott without meaning to hurt him, but knowing that death or injury could result from his actions, then that moment of reckless rage amounts to the same thing: a verdict of murder.
But if Kolola fired on Scott while too drunk or confused to realize that he might kill a man, the shooting was an accident and Kolola is therefore guilty of the lesser charge of manslaughter.
And Kilpatrick said if the jury has any reasonable doubt of Kolola’s intent, such doubt must be applied to Kolola’s benefit and the lesser verdict must be applied.
With witnesses and a recorded confession as evidence, there is now no doubt that Kolola fired the gun that ended Scott’s life.
But defence lawyer Andrew Mahar argued that Kolola, angry, drunk and suicidal, had not meant to kill Scott and that the shooting was a tragic accident.
“The greatest danger to police officers doesn’t come from criminals,” Mahar told the jury. “It comes from the potential for violence in ordinary people.”
Kolola was the only witness in the defence’s case, saying in his evidence that the bullet he fired through Scott’s skull had been meant to scare him off, fired one-handed while drunk, with his infant son Adam cradled in his other arm.
“There are no monsters here,” Mahar said.
At the start of his trial Kolola tried to plead guilty to manslaughter, a plea that Kilpatrick rejected.
Crown prosecutor Suzanne Boucher said in her closing arguments that the defence’s explanation of what led to Scott’s death “did not make sense.”
“Mr. Kolola knew he was shooting at an on-duty police officer,” she said.
Boucher argued that the precision of the lethal shot, combined with Kolola’s history of skilled marksmanship, shows that Kolola had meant to fire at Scott, and not just at Scott’s vehicle.
Kolola is a highly skilled marksman and had said in court that he and his friends sometimes held one-handed shooting contests while out hunting.
“A straight shot… should suggest to you an intentional aim and not a random shot,” Boucher told the jury.
Boucher also questioned whether Kolola actually fired the shot one-handed, as he claimed in his evidence.
A 30.06 rifle has a significant recoil, said a firearms expert who testified in the trial.
She therefore suggested that perhaps Kolola had put his son down to make the shot, or left him in his truck when Scott’s police truck approached.
“Does it make sense that Mr. Kolola would fire his gun while holding a baby?” she asked the jury.
But even if Kolola fired one-handed, Boucher argued he had the skill and the intent to make a lethal shot.
Boucher characterized Kolola as consumed with rage after a night of violent confrontations with family, friends and co-workers.
Unplanned murder in a moment of great emotion is usually classed as second-degree murder, but when the victim is an on-duty peace officer, the Criminal Code requires it be treated as a first-degree charge.
Boucher said that when Scott came after Kolola in response to a drunk driving complaint, Scott became the unfortunate victim of Kolola’s rage.
She argued if Kolola had not meant to hurt or kill Scott, he would have aimed his “warning shot” in a more appropriate direction if its intent had been merely to scare him off, such as into the air or away from the truck.
“This so-called warning shot went right through Const. Scott’s head,” she said. “The shot could not have been anything other than intentional.”
The defence lawyer argued that Kolola was drunk and not thinking rationally enough to appreciate the potential lethality of pointing and firing a high-powered rifle at an occupied vehicle.
Part of the defence case relied on evidence that Kolola had been become suicidal after drunken confrontations with his common-law spouse and other family members.
Kolola testified that he had loaded his rifle with a single bullet, intent on suicide.
Shooting Scott, according to the defence, was a spur-of-the-moment reaction to Scott’s approach.
But Boucher suggested that Kolola left his home with a rifle loaded with a full clip of ammunition, ready for confrontation, not the single bullet that he claimed when he gave evidence in his defence.
She reminded the jury that police had found Kolola’s rifle with a partially loaded magazinee.
And she suggested that after shooting Scott, Kolola tried to re-load his rifle with fully-loaded magazine so police would not find his rifle with a magazine short of one bullet.
Kolola hid a used shell case, along with a marijuana pipe, also showing that he was sober enough to think about concealing potential evidence against him, Boucher said.
But Kilpatrick told the jury that Kolola’s attempt to conceal evidence should not be used as evidence of intent. He said Kolola’s actions were also consistent with the actions of someone who had made a tragic mistake, like an accidental shooting.
But those actions could help the jury decide on his state of intoxication or sobriety in evaluating how drunk Kolola was at the time, Kilpatrick told them.
Boucher said Kolola was not so drunk that he forgot that shooting in the direction of a person can kill them.
Kolola’s life as a hunter and a Canadian Ranger meant that he was intimately familiar with firearms and knew better than to fire in the direction of a person, she said.
She said evidence from various witnesses showed that Kolola was in control of himself despite his alcohol and drug consumption that evening.
He was walking and driving straight and speaking clearly — except in moments of high emotion after Scott’s death.
After Kolola fired the fateful shot, he found the constable dead and slumped.
Kilpatrick said Kolola’s action could be interpreted as either showing his sobriety, or showing he was too drunk to realize what he had done.
The jury was whittled down to 11 members last week when Kilpatrick excused one member who had to attend to a pressing personal issue.
It now appears likely that jury deliberations will continue on the morning of March 10.















